Networks aiming for fundamental changes bring together a variety of actors who are part and parcel of a problematic context. These system innovation projects need to be accompanied by a monitoring and evaluation approach that supports and maintains reflexivity to be able to deal with uncertainties and conflicts while challenging current practices and related institutions. This article reports on experiences with reflexive process monitoring (RPM)-an approach that has been applied in several networks in the Dutch agricultural sector, which strive for sustainable development. Particular attention is paid to conducting system analyses-a core element of the methodology. The first results show that system analyses indeed have the potential to enhance reflexivity if carried out collectively. However, regular patterns of thinking and acting within projects interfere in subtle ways with the new knowledge generated and limit the transformation of the reflexive feedback and insights into action.
Over the past decades, the world has been facing a range of problems connected with former and current lifestyles and modes of production. The success of former production and consumption has resulted in serious side effects. Factories, airplanes, and cars have produced high levels of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions that are endangering the climate; animal husbandry creates new diseases that affect animals and humans alike (Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis [BSE] , severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS] , and HN51) and continue (although major steps have been taken in this respect) to pollute soil, water, and air. Conventional ''modernist'' ways of addressing such problems have often failed, arguably because they tended to assume that problems could be solved and controlled rationally on the basis of unequivocal knowledge and/or by manipulating a limited set of variables (Dörner, 1996; Holling, 1995) . However, such modes of problem solving have proved unable to deal with the political and power dynamics around problem settings (Ringsing & Leeuwis, 2008) and tend to be ill equipped to handle uncertainty, ambiguity, risks, and unintended consequences (Beck, 1997; Giddens, 1998) . Thus, our problem-solving procedures are in many ways part of the problem. In line with this, Voß, Bauknecht, and Kemp (2006, p. xiv) state that '' . . . most pressing problems of modern society are those which are caused by the side effects of past problem solving.'' If this is true, if progress is overthrown by massive side effects, then '' . . . the ideals of certain knowledge, unambiguous evaluation as well as planning and control become revealed as illusionary'' (Voß et al., 2006, p. xiv) . This means that ways of thinking, of problem solving, of managing resources and people, and of planning, need to be reconsidered. Such an alteration of modes of knowledge generation and use can be seen as reflexive modernization, based on the work of Beck (1997) .
The realization that problem-solving methods need radical change to ensure a transformation toward a more sustainable world has entered many sectors and disciplines over the last decade or so. Although proclaiming basically a development in which economic, sociopolitical, and environmental needs are met, the concept of sustainable development is ambiguous. Many definitions have been developed as well as contested. Some scholars regard this as a flaw that must be mended (e.g., by operationalizing it scientifically) or propose to reject the concept of sustainable development completely (Jickling, 1994; Mebratu, 1998) . Others, to whom we align, see its ambiguity as an inherent feature of the concept and regard a degree of vagueness as an advantage for bringing multiple parties together to deal with the complex and socially contested issues surrounding sustainability (Grin, 2006; Jacobs, 1999) .
More consensus has evolved on the opinion that, albeit indeterminate in general, a sustainable development cannot take place without system innovation; this means that whole systems of production and consumption change, including social relationships, division of roles, formal rules and values, and the technical artifacts and infrastructure that have coevolved with earlier, ''unsustainable'' production and consumption practices (Geels, 2004; Grin & van Staveren, 2007; Rip & Kemp, 1998) . The same argumentation holds for other major societal concerns and ambitions, such as achieving food security, enhancing energy independence, or realizing affordable health care for all.
Processes of system change have a longtime horizon and are complex because of the many interrelated actors and factors. New research has been undertaken and theories have been developed that show that these system innovations are characterized by fundamental uncertainties, chaos, unintended consequences, conflicts, and unpredictable trajectories of change, which cannot be understood from a reductionist perspective, or, for that matter, from the perspective of direct causeeffect relations that seem to be at the core of former problem-solving approaches (Prigogine & Stengers, 1990; Rotmans, Loorbach, & van de Brugge, 2005) .
Along with the vision on how system innovation takes place, the ideas about how system innovation might be stimulated and managed have evolved considerably. Currently, the emergence of new organizational forms for stimulating innovation is evident, appearing under a variety of banners such as transdisciplinary research projects, network approaches, system innovation programs, publicprivate partnerships, and transition management arenas (de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1995; Osborne, 2000; Regeer & Bunders, 2003; Rotmans et al., 2005) . Although there are many operational differences, these new forms have in common that they tend to bring together a variety of actors who are part and parcel of a problematic context that is seen to demand innovation and somehow facilitate a collective process in which new social and technical solutions, or at least their contours, are designed, agreed, and/or acted upon. In addition to programs and projects, which are explicit about the wish to realize system innovation, there exist many well-defined policies, initiatives, and programs that seek to bring about fundamental changes in systems, but do not frame their efforts in terms of system innovation. Examples for this can be easily found in the sphere of development cooperation, the health sector, or natural resource management. We feel that the monitoring approach discussed in this article can be relevant to those endeavors as well.
Although system innovations because of their complexity and longtime horizon are by definition out of reach of system innovative undertakings, what can be done is to try and contribute to system innovation by stimulating learning in the sense of a change of thinking and acting. Several authors argue that system innovation projects must be reflexive, that is, they must enable the challenging and change of presumptions, current practices, and the underlying institutions, either in the design of a project or in its management (Grin, Felix, Bos, & Spoelstra, 2004; Voß & Kemp, 2006) . In these reflexive undertakings, institutions such as the market, state, science, and society, and their relations, are not conceived as givens, but as objects of scrutiny and change. In this way, complete knowledge and maximization of control are replaced by continued learning.
Managers of reflexive programs aimed at stimulating system innovation face a number of challenges when it comes to project management:
1. Outcomes of project interventions cannot be predefined but are emergent because system innovations are highly complex without clear causal strands and linear paths (Rogers, 2008) . System innovations consist of many different social and technical components that cannot be usefully identified in advance and are partly invisible and/or intangible (Wiskerke & van der Ploeg, 2004) . 2. Problem definitions, search directions, solutions, and routes are likely, and must be allowed, to change. That many innovation initiatives eventually fail is a normal state of affairs in view of the evolutionary character of innovation dynamics (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987) that require a certain redundancy of competing initiatives. Managers of system innovation projects need to be flexible in their endeavors and embark on new paths. 3. Although operating in these murky contexts and going through learning by doing, managers may lose their focus on system innovation and work on minor improvements and reproduce the patterns of modernization instead. For system innovation to take place, managers need a clear view on what types of radical solutions may contribute to system change.
We start from the premise that these management challenges have implications for monitoring and evaluation as well. System innovation projects need not only to be reflexive in design, planning, and management but also to be accompanied by a monitoring and evaluation approach that supports and maintains such reflexivity. The main aim of reflexive monitoring and evaluation is to enhance the reflexivity of a project; this means that participants scrutinize the relationships between the incumbent system, project activities, intermediate results, and the long-term, ultimate aim of system change. It is reflexive in itself in the recognition that no innovation network or single actor, the evaluator included, is completely detached or protected from vested institutions and classic problem solving. Experience has taught that innovative arrangements or ''spaces for change'' are not isolated from existing institutions even if the participants strive for new relationships and formulate new rules (Fisher, Miller, & Sidney, 2007; Grin et al., 2004) . Project participants and evaluators, thus, must reflexively monitor their own practices, presumptions, and roles, as well as the way they monitor and evaluate. In summary, reflexive monitoring and evaluation methodologies must be able to:
1. Support complex projects without predefined outcomes to design, redesign, and act upon project activities while acknowledging that the ambitious long-term goals are out of reach; 2. Facilitate learning by questioning participants' presumptions, values, and practices, as well as those of actors who are indirectly related to the project; and van Mierlo et al. 145 3. Contribute to collective, institutional change, within the project and via the project, which is regarded as contributing to system innovation.
In this article, we first explain the extent to which existing methodologies of monitoring and evaluation meet the reflexive monitoring and evaluation needs of system innovation projects. Taking these needs as the point of departure, this article briefly explains how they were transformed into a practical methodology, called reflexive process monitoring (RPM), and how this methodology was applied in agricultural innovation networks in the Netherlands. We focus on our experiences with one of the main building blocks of RPM-the innovation system (IS) framework. This framework was used to conduct analyses of various networks (fruit, greenhouse, and maize), which worked on sustainable development in their sector. We discuss how and to what extent the application of the framework in these networks contributed to reflexivity.
In Between Paradigms for Monitoring and Evaluation
Our quest for a monitoring and evaluation methodology that would address the complexity of system innovation and stimulate reflexivity was triggered when one of the many agricultural innovation projects in the Netherlands requested us to monitor and evaluate their efforts in network building and their contribution toward system innovation. We scrutinized various monitoring and evaluation methodologies to see how they could support system innovation projects, given the requirements mentioned above. Although any classification of evaluation methodologies has its shortcomings, 1 we follow a rough division used by Mertens (1999) : methodologies mainly based on the positivist (Lay & Papadopoulos, 2007) , the constructivist, and the transformative paradigms (see Table 1 ). The distinction between the first two paradigms is described by others in terms of quantitative versus qualitative methodologies (European Centre for Development Policy Management [ECDPM], 2006; Mark, Greene, & Shaw, 2006) .
The positivist paradigm is directly related to the modernist view on problem solving. It is founded on the idea that one reality, or truth, exists that can be known by outsiders with a certain probability, and that processes of change can be planned and controlled rationally. This parallels the use of monitoring and evaluation methodologies that are directed at assessing the progress, effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of the realization of predefined goals (OESP, 1997; Pitman, Feinstein, & Ingram, 2005) . This type of monitoring and evaluation often takes place to account for the investments made in a project or program and therefore focuses heavily on the realization of predefined results that can be determined, measured, and assessed objectively by an outsider/expert. Often, presumed causal relationships between interventions and intended outcomes are investigated and assessed (program theory). However, such methodologies do not suit innovation projects that start from roughly defined directions and goals (i.e., yet-to-be negotiated and designed system innovations) and take a relatively open process approach to achieving them.
Another shortcoming of the positivist monitoring and evaluation methodologies is that they make a limited contribution to learning in, and adaptation of, ongoing change processes and are less sensitive to integrating relevant stakeholder criteria (Guba & Lincoln, 1989 ). This does not, however, mean that positivist methodologies are not useful for system innovation projects at all. They can provide a framework to stimulate project leaders and network managers to make their assumptions about the relations between project activities and long-term goals explicit and hence subject to evaluation (see also Arkesteijn, van Mierlo, & Potter, 2007) .
More broadly, the ontological and epistemological foundations of the positivist paradigm have often been criticized by authors who start from a constructivist perspective, in which it is claimed that reality is not given but shaped by people in interaction. Multiple realities exist and can only be known via interaction. Monitoring and evaluation methodologies based on this paradigm, including fourth generation evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) , responsive evaluation (Abma & Widdershoven, 2005; Stake, 1983) , learning histories (Kleiner & Roth, 1997) , most significant change (Davies & Dart, 2005) , and horizontal evaluation (Thiele, Devaux, Velasco, & Horton, 2007) , aim to do justice to the existence of multiple perspectives and evaluation criteria. Monitoring and evaluation is regarded as a strategy that may contribute to collective agenda setting and shared learning. Results and predefined goals are usually of second-order importance only, or not at all. The methodologies can help participants to understand each others' viewpoints. Another strength is that decisions taken in relation to constructivist monitoring and evaluation can build on strong support from actors. The emphasis on learning in these constructivist approaches resonates well with wider calls for learningoriented (and unlearning-oriented) monitoring and evaluation (Engel & Carlsson, 2002; Patton, 2001; Schön, 1983; Uphoff & Combs, 2001) .
Although the emphasis on learning and joint reality construction seems valuable in the specific context of initiatives to foster system innovation, there may be a tension between the need to challenge existing institutional conditions and rooting the monitoring and evaluation in stakeholder perspectives and objectives. After all, these perspectives and goals may well be part of the problem. Hence, we feel that an approach to the reflexive monitoring of system innovation trajectories would require a normative component to support the challenging of current modes of thinking among stakeholders. In face of the current problems, reality is seen as socially constructed, but in addition as in need of reconstruction. Although it is basically founded on a constructivist paradigm, it is more normative.
Table 1 may suggest that reflexive monitoring is related to the third paradigm mentioned and advocated by Mertens, which is seeking structural reform. In the transformative paradigm, different perspectives are seen to be grounded in power inequalities that should be leveled. Whereas power relations may well reinforce current practices, a change in these relations will not necessarily contribute to system change. Our plea is not to increase objectivity by inviting marginalized groups to participate but to support networks of interrelated actors to challenge systems and to develop radically new visions and practices.
The Building Blocks of RPM
To evaluate intermediary results of a project and the ''progress'' toward or away from the ultimate, long-term ambition of system innovation, we needed to identify specific markers, against which we van Mierlo et al. 147 could measure the reflexivity of the project. Furthermore, special tools were needed to realize the challenging of actors' own and each other's assumptions, values, practices, as well as the underlying social institutions. Therefore, we used relevant theories to formulate indicators in terms of learning, the development of new practices, and institutional change. Moreover, we adapted and developed instruments that can stimulate these processes. Both the reflection on the progress in terms of the indicators chosen and the use of tools are expected to boost the reflexivity of projects.
Framework for System Analysis
In RPM, we make use of several instruments. To facilitate observation, there are, for instance, interview questionnaires and a checklist for assessing the process conditions based on the sets of indicators. Analytical instruments include network analysis and stakeholders' problem definition analysis. An instrument that specifically stimulates reflection on the project interventions and their short-term effectiveness is the keeping of a diary by the project manager and evaluator.
One of the main instruments is the IS framework. For reasons mentioned in the next paragraph, we expect that its specific features may help to enhance the reflexivity of a system innovation project. Here, we describe its foundations, its main characteristics, and its general use in the cases.
The framework is grounded in a thorough overview of the systemic factors hindering actor learning and innovation, known in innovation science as system failures or system imperfections (Klein Woolthuis, Gilsing, & Lankhuizen, 2005) . We distinguish the following features of an incumbent system that may provide a hindrance to, or, its opposite, a window of opportunity for, innovation 2 :
1. Physical infrastructure, such as railways and telecommunication systems; 2. Knowledge infrastructure, the way the creation and use of knowledge is organized; 3. Hard institutions, formal laws, regulations, and norms; 4. Soft institutions, values, and implicit rules of the game; Figure 1 . System analysis of the glass group (in grey the system imperfections and in white the windows of opportunity).
5. Interaction, a too strong or too weak interaction between actors; 6. Market structure, the positions of and relations between market parties, for example, monopoly and transparency.
In view of this list, it is not only past problem solving (which fits under the heading of knowledge infrastructure) that may hinder change toward a sustainable development or another system innovative ambition but also institutionalized ways of producing, intermediating, and consuming. The system features are placed in rows of a matrix. In the columns of the matrix are the actors that cause and reproduce these barriers in their daily practices. See Figure 1 for an example relating to the greenhouse (glass) sector. Although the framework was used in different ways (see below), the system analyses served the project managers, evaluators, and participants to reflect on the main bottlenecks that prevent the current system from moving toward a more sustainable system and the windows of opportunity that may enhance a transformation. In addition, it was used to reflect on project interventions that were planned or to be designed in relation to the features of and developments in the incumbent system. Figure 2 provides an example of analysis of this match between project actions and bottlenecks in the system (again relating to the greenhouse sector).
The Assessment of Reflexivity
Indicators were used in RPM to assess whether the reflexivity of the projects was enhanced and to reflect with the participants in the agricultural innovation networks on the project actions and their effects in the light of system innovation. For the purposes of this article, the markers are applied only to analyze whether the use of the IS framework actually helped to increase the reflexivity of a project.
The indicators are grounded in theories on learning and (system) innovation processes. At both the level of the single participating actor and the level of the whole network involved in a system van Mierlo et al. 149 innovation project, we formulated indicators for fundamental learning, new practices, and institutional change. Table 2 presents an overview (van Mierlo, Arkesteijn, & Leeuwis, 2007) . A relevant concept of learning often used in innovation theories is second-order learning. This concept was originally developed by Argyris and Schön (1996) to analyze learning in organizations. Of relevance here is the notion that people are inclined to learn at a first-order level, in which their original assumptions, values, and goals are left intact. In other words, they do different things to attain the same goal. More rare are incidences of the more radical form of second-order learning in which not just ideas on solutions change but these fundamental notions as well. This secondorder learning may very well serve processes toward system innovation. However, even when second-order learning is triggered, the relatively stable institutional setting may remain unchallenged. Therefore, RPM works in conjunction with the concept of system learning; this means that actors redefine the very structures that hinder their aspirations for new, for example, more sustainable practices and come to regard the relationships between the structures in which they operate and their own practices in a new light (Loeber, van Mierlo, Grin, & Leeuwis, 2007) . Although conceptually and in practice cognitive changes and changes in practices are intrinsically related, they are distinguished analytically. Thus, second-order and system learning are linked with a change in practices or in actors' daily institutional setting.
On the level of the network involved in the project, we monitor convergent learning, which occurs when actors develop visions on solutions and problems that complement one another, and change their roles and goals in close association with each other. For example, a reduction in chemical use for crop protection may be acceptable to growers as a cost reduction and a way to maintain diversity in ways to protect crops, it may be acceptable to government because it helps them to protect the environment and produce safe drinking water, and consumers may appreciate having fewer residues on fruit and vegetables. Finally, new semicoordinated practices and coordinated action to fight institutional barriers are seen as relevant indicators. All these effects at the level of the innovation network are only to be expected some time after the initiation of an innovation project.
Fundamental learning does not come about easily. People in general have the tendency to ignore information that does not suit their visions and practices. If actors are confronted with new perspectives in an environment of trust, such learning may take place nonetheless.
An earlier study (van Mierlo, Leeuwis, Smits, & Klein Woolthuis, 2010) showed in hindsight that, in a system innovation program in which the project actions had addressed the system imperfections as perceived by the participants, some of them had changed their values and had started experimenting with new practices, whereas in another program with many mismatches hardly any learning and change occurred at the network level. Thus, it seems plausible that ensuring a proper match between the project activities and the systemic flaws or barriers as perceived by the actors involved is a relevant condition for people in an innovation network to learn and change.
Therefore, we expect that integrating a system analysis (conducted with the aid of the IS framework) into an innovation network's activities to generate new knowledge and reflect on it may well 1. It may help participants to define the main system imperfections and their interrelationships and hence to recognize complexity, multicausality, and unexpected results. 2. By reflecting on which actors reproduce systemic barriers, participants in system innovation projects may also be stimulated to question these ''given'' conditions and start seeing them as changeable. This means that actors no longer take the characteristics of the system as barriers that prevent them from changing routines, but as windows of opportunity that could help them in their endeavor, or even become a focus of project actions (see 3). 3. Ultimately, the results of the system analysis could give focus and help to plan collective project activities: to design radical options to work on, to check intended activities, or to reorient the directions chosen previously to more radical solutions that challenge system failures. Hence, the IS framework can be used in different phases of a project, to help design, to monitor, and to evaluate.
The IS Framework in Action
One way to create reflexivity in the agricultural sector is to design completely new systems; this is currently happening in projects mainly in Dutch animal sectors (e.g., Grin et al., 2004) . Diametrically opposite are system innovation initiatives in the plant sector, which start from practices in the existing system and desire to challenge the barriers associated with, among other things, the knowledge infrastructure. To demonstrate the use of the IS framework in practice, we turn to an example of the latter: the project Farming with a Future. We applied the IS framework in four networks involved in this project. The project started in 2001 as an extension project to demonstrate and disseminate best practices to growers with the aim of contributing to sustainable crop production through integrated pest management and sustainable fertilization. After a while, it was concluded by the management that growers' practices would only change if other actors around them, such as traders in pesticides and fertilizers, suppliers, and manufacturers, changed the way they worked as well. Hence, from 2004 onward, networks were built to involve a range of relevant stakeholders that were willing to cooperate to develop more sustainable practices in crop production. The project also assumed a more formal role as one of the projects of the Dutch covenant on crop protection. This covenant (established in 2003) is a national platform of all actors involved in crop protection that aims (among other things) to contribute to a 95% reduction in the environmental impact of pest management and crop fertilization on surface water, and a 95% reduction in the bottlenecks in the production of drinking water from surface water in 2010, compared to the year 1998.
After introducing each network, we show how the system analysis was conducted. After that we elucidate the results of the analysis in terms of barriers, windows of opportunity, and matches with project interventions. Then, we describe the responses from the network participants in the light of the indicators mentioned above: fundamental learning, new practices, and institutional change.
Two Fruit Networks
The first system analyses were conducted for two fruit networks: the strawberry and the tree fruit networks. The first started in 2000/2001 as a study group of strawberry growers and evolved from 2004 onward into a network that consisted of strawberry growers, local and regional directors of the van Mierlo et al. 151
Dutch Federation of Agriculture and Horticulture, a contract worker, several retailers, and two network managers of Farming with a Future. The aim of the network was mainly to prevent emissions from fertilization; strawberries do not tend to suffer from pests and diseases. Some tests were carried out on composting, disinfection, and fumigation of the soil, and growers were given information on best practices. The main activity, however, was to test the consequences for strawberry production of the new norm for nitrogen (N-norm) set by the government to fight the pollution of surface and ground water.
3
The core of the tree fruit network started in 2004 as a group of fruit growers (mainly apple and pear) and a retailer in pest management. A broader group, with representatives from other retailers/ consultants on pest management and a water board 4 among others, joined the study group less frequently. Crop protection is of special importance in this sector because the chemicals against pests and diseases are applied horizontally to the trees. Horizontal application causes drift emission to surface water. The ultimate aim was to reduce emissions to surface and ground water. The main activities were testing and discussing best practices for integrated pest management and emission reduction.
Facilitation and outcome of the system analyses. In 2006, the evaluator interviewed all members of the two networks and some relative outsiders to explore their perceptions of barriers to integrated pest management and sustainable fertilization in their sector. All barriers mentioned by more than one interviewee were entered into the IS matrix.
Contrary to what the evaluator expected, the growers in the strawberry network were not so much concerned about emissions as about the low nitrogen usage norm. They were convinced that it would hinder the production of strawberries in the long run. This opinion was shared with the contract worker and retailers, whereas the water board and the staff of Farming with a Future desired to contribute to low-emission production. However, because it was important to the growers, the project manager agreed to test the norms first. Because of the lack of a shared problem definition, the system analysis was of poor quality. In addition to the ''too low N-norm,'' a lack of a mutual understanding between all actors involved in the sector and the high costs of sustainable alternatives were stated to be the main barriers.
The tree fruit network saw the lack of alternatives to chemical pest management as one of the main barriers to changing to a low-emission production system. This was seen as caused by a lack of funding for research on nonchemical methods by research institutes, producers, and their organizations. The chemical producers, however, have invested significant amounts of money on the development of chemical pesticides and await a return on their investment.
The network participants saw two windows of opportunity as well: (a) The demands of the auction sector were becoming more stringent and forced the growers to deliver fruit with a maximum of three different types of residue. (b) The European Water Framework directive would probably set stricter norms for herbicide and pesticide residues in ground and surface water in 2015.
In the case of the strawberry network, the testing of norm-compliant fertilization strategies for their effects on production for more than a 3-year period matched the perception of one part of the network that the N-norm was too low. The extension and testing activities partly made up for the lack of research but not for the lack of mutual understanding and the high costs of the alternatives.
In the tree fruit network, it appeared that the activity of testing best and good practices made up for the perceived lack of research to some extent as well but did not deal with the other barriers. No action was taken in relation to the windows of opportunity either.
The contribution of the analyses to reflexivity. The results of the system analyses based on the interviews were presented to the network managers to check them and to stimulate the managers to reflect on the systemic features of the sector in which they worked. In the same meeting, the matches and gaps between the project activities and the barriers were discussed.
Although the evaluator's conclusions on the main barriers and windows of opportunity were acknowledged by the managers of both networks, they responded defensively to some of the gaps shown. Although it was explained that not all system imperfections could or should be addressed and that the model was merely meant as a tool to reflect on the focus of the project, this barely reassured the managers. They indicated that they had obtained valuable new ideas from the feedback sessions but would not turn these new insights into action. For example, to explain why they would not try to involve the auction sector in the tree fruit network, the network managers said that they were used to doing research and testing best practices in the field and were not sure how to manage such a social process.
Because the analyses were not discussed in the networks themselves, there were presumably no direct effects in the networks. The system analyses did, however, have an influence on the overall project. The analyses demonstrated the large gap between the projects' ambitions and the networks' activities that still focused on testing and diffusing best practices instead of creating novel dynamics in heterogeneous networks. The evaluators discussed the results of the system analyses and other monitoring results with the project managers, who were also advised by a consultant on stakeholder management. In that way, the project managers were guided gently toward the new role that they envisaged. It made them decide to select some networks to be spearheads for better stakeholder management, of which the next two cases are part.
The Glass Group
In the greenhouse sector in 2007, some Farming with a Future researchers planned to set up a network to reduce the emission of chemical pesticides to the surface water by greenhouse cultivation. A few years earlier, a RIZA report (RIZA, The National Institute for Water Management and Waste Water Management, 2005) had shown that emissions of chemicals used in greenhouses were still too high, despite the norms for usage per acre already being met. These norms proved to be insufficient to achieve the water quality norms. The sense of urgency among important actors became more pressing when the plan for regional expansion of greenhouse cultivation in Southern Holland was quashed because the greenhouse sector was not able to guarantee an improvement in water quality. The project managers' plan was to establish a network and, some time after, the idea was developed to run a pilot project in a greenhouse area to reduce emissions in cooperation with relevant actors such as the water board, a chemical producer, and greenhouse keepers. In this pilot, research was to be conducted on the emission routes in the smaller canals in one of the polders.
Facilitation and outcome of the system analysis. Because the glass network was still in the setup stage, it was possible to integrate the system analysis into the design of the network activities. In this case, the system analysis was conducted collectively with the management team, consisting of six persons in total. The evaluator provided facilitation.
After an initial failure, the final system analysis that was performed collectively proved to be very in-depth.
5 As a first step, the team members were asked to write down and present to one another what they saw as the main barriers to sustainable crop protection in greenhouse cultivation, as well as the main windows of opportunity in the dominant, prevailing system. They were asked to draw on their knowledge, experience, and contacts in the field. In a next round, the team members were requested to critically ''interrogate'' each other on the underlying causes of the barriers mentioned and to consider the interrelationships between them.
A last review on completeness was conducted by checking all the empty cells in the matrix. It transpired that the systemic feature ''hard institutions'' had been overlooked by mistake: emissions van Mierlo et al. are measured at only about seven central points in a water catchment area. Actual local emissions thus are not known nor can they be traced back to the sources and the practices causing them. As a result, greenhouse keepers who abuse the norm cannot be sanctioned. Furthermore, the development of knowledge by research institutes on emission and emission routes was considered slow and very expensive.
In the final conclusion, another system barrier was the insufficiency of organic means to fight pests, due to priorities in budgeting in research institutes (see Figure 1) . However, best and good practices available are still underutilized, because there is hardly any demand for organic or lowemissions flowers and plants, and there is a lack of interaction among actors in the sector to exchange knowledge.
The greenhouse keepers saw much the same windows of opportunity as the tree fruit network in that the auction and retail sectors were raising their norms for residues on fruit and vegetables, and it was hoped that these would be extended to flowers and plants. Another chance was provided by the development of the European Water Framework directive.
The contribution of the analysis to reflexivity. According to all participants, the meeting generated a lot of energy when the new insight into the problems of maintaining the norms emerged and also when, nearing the end, it became clear that the envisaged approach of the regional pilot that had been developed (seemingly) intuitively thus far, addressed an interrelated group of barriers around the impossibility to trace emissions back to the locations and practices causing them (see Figure 2) . In addition, the network would be built as it was pictured before the meeting took place, but, in line with the outcomes of the system analysis, supplemented with representatives from the auction and retail sectors.
Through the step-by-step, cyclical approach, the definition of the barriers changed and became more in-depth because their interrelations were considered as well. However, it did not lead to a change of plan for the pilot, and indeed it did not need to, as the plan was supported by the results to a great extent. The barrier of ''a lack of enforcement in case of abuse'' was purposely not addressed to keep the greenhouse keepers motivated to participate in the network.
The Maize Network
The network for maize production (as cow fodder) was set up in 2007 to reduce the emission of herbicides to surface water. Despite all past efforts, these emissions were and are still too high. Reducing the emissions was urgent for at least two reasons. The drinking water company had to restrict the extraction of drinking water from the Maas River due to too high levels of herbicides in the water in 2006, and the European Water Framework directive was likely to affect the use of certain herbicides. The network to deal with these problems included representatives of a water board, the agrichemical industry, the Board for Agricultural Contract Workers, the Dutch Federation of Agriculture and Horticulture, and the chemical retailers/advisors. Over the years, the activities of this network ranged from extension practices, and some testing of the contribution of emissions resulting from cleaning machines (a form of point emission), to a pilot study of emission sources and routes.
Facilitation and outcome of the system analysis. The system analysis was performed by the evaluator on the basis of project documentation and participatory observation of three meetings of the network. The results were used for reflection in three different ways. First, they were shared with the two network managers of Farming with a Future. Then, a simplified version of the analysis was used in interviews conducted by the evaluator with a number of actors. From that point onward, the results were used time and again by the evaluator to draw the attention of one of the project managers to the systemic barriers. In a feedback session after every network meeting, the matrix was used to discuss whether the analysis was still valid or whether there was any progress in terms of network building, commitment, and action by the participants.
The identified barriers resembled the final conclusion of the glass group in broad lines. They included the lack of knowledge on the level of emissions, their sources, and routes. This was perceived to be related to several other interrelated barriers that worsen the situation, like the practice of the water board to measure it at only a few central points. The water board did and does not have the mandate to undertake research on emission routes and therefore does not have the earmarked budget to do so. Moreover, the covenant on crop protection is not binding, and nobody is sanctioned if the policy goals are not reached or rewarded if they are. Another barrier is that farmers, contract workers, and advisors do not derive a significant economic benefit by changing their current practices. A final barrier exists in the lack of interaction between the water board, the research institutes, the farmers, and the contract workers.
Again, a window of opportunity was provided by the European Water Framework directive.
The contribution of the analysis to reflexivity. During the first reflection on the system analysis presented by the evaluator, the network managers endorsed the conclusions on barriers and opportunities, and agreed that activities should be directed at them. In their activities, they gave some attention to the barrier of a lack of knowledge on emission routes by undertaking some minor research with the water board on one of these routes: point emissions. The other barriers were not addressed, except for the lack of interaction between the actors because interaction was created through the establishment of the maize network itself. Moreover, the managers were convinced that it was better to stick to the extension of best practices-such as the use of harrows for mechanical weeding to reduce emissions-to farmers and others, through magazine articles, although the farmers' lack of knowledge on best practices was not one of the main barriers.
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During the interviews in which the simplified version of the system analysis was presented, two of the participants came up with ideas to challenge barriers. The water board representative realized that the regular way of measuring emissions was one of the system barriers. He came up with the first thoughts about studying emission routes by measuring emissions in water channels close to the field and more frequently. With his proposal to conduct a pilot, he crossed the border of the mandate and role of a water board. The chemical manufacturers' representative suggested certifying contract workers who applied certain measures to prevent emission with the intention of giving them the financial stimulus that was lacking according to the system analysis. With this, again, one of the participants proposed an intervention that moved beyond his classical role.
In the network meetings following the interviews, the plan for a pilot to study emission routes was introduced. The network decided in favor of it, and all the participants contributed either human power or money. It was a first step in dealing with a system barrier collectively. In addition to the pilot, still a lot of effort was put into communicating to farmers and contract workers the need to use best practices.
The idea of certifying contract workers was also raised during one of the meetings. Not all participants were keen on this idea. Among them was the contract workers' representative who explained that he could not support the plan because his constituency included contract workers that were not ''early adopters.'' Since then, this issue has received little attention.
During meetings and interviews, other representatives too explained that a lack of support from their organization or constituency hindered them from taking the suggested actions or approving a plan for a network activity. The water board representative, whose manager was questioning his participation and time spent in the network, felt squeezed between the network ambitions and his organization; the retailers' representative exclaimed that his colleagues were fed up at times with his messages on emissions; the producers' representatives stated they had hardly any influence on the farmers; and the contract workers' representative stated that he was working on many more issues at van Mierlo et al. the same time and needed to defend many other interests. With the by then new network manager, the results of the system analysis were discussed in regular feedback discussions after network meetings. Just like the first manager, he was in support of extension to the farmers and communication to convince other stakeholders that emission reduction would be in their own interest in the long run (the main idea behind stakeholder management). Later on, he started talking in terms of system barriers and opportunities instead and concluded that communication with stakeholders would probably be insufficient to reach the goals.
Analysis
Although our first experiences are not exhaustive, it seems that the system analyses did contribute to reflexivity. The effects did not, however, live fully up to expectations. Comparing the networks, we discuss what responses were aroused by the system analyses and what conditions seem to have influenced the way in which project managers and participants dealt with the new knowledge generated.
The indicators of fundamental learning, new practices, and institutional change mentioned in Table 2 served to analyze the extent to which the system analyses contributed to the reflexivity of the networks. We start with the three dimensions of system learning in relation to which we especially expected added value because of the use of the IS framework: recognizing the multicausality of current problems, redefining features of the dominant system from barriers into opportunities, and redesigning radical options for collective project actions.
In broad terms, all actors who reflected on the results of the system analyses acknowledged the complexity of the system in which they operated and the multicausality of the continuance of the current system. In the fruit networks, the analyses were very fragmented though. In the glass group and the maize network, they helped better to see the interrelatedness between the main system imperfections. In only one of the networks, did the system analysis help to redefine one of the central systemic barriers into a window of opportunity; this was in the maize case, in which the barrier was even reformulated into a core focus of the network. The system analysis of the maize sector thus also helped the invention of a new radical option for coordinated action, as it did to a limited extent in the glass group too. In the two fruit networks, the system analysis provided the network managers with new insights into systemic barriers but did not guide them to redefine them as windows of opportunity or to design appropriate directions of actions.
Convergent learning could not be expected to take place in these fruit networks, because the results were not presented to participants other than the managers. In contrast, in the maize and glass networks, consensus emerged on the main systemic barriers in their respective systems but not always on the kind of project actions perceived as most useful by the participants in the light of the system analyses.
Did system analysis also help to recognize and scrutinize personal assumptions and values (second-order learning)? In the glass group, this did not happen because the planned project actions already matched quite well with the system failures. In the fruit networks, the network managers responded defensively to the suggested lack of a match. During the first reflection on the incumbent system in the maize network, more or less the same occurred. This changed when the new manager took over. He redefined his assumptions and his own role. In addition, some maize network participants were stimulated to reconsider their roles when the system analysis was discussed in interviews.
In all groups, the system analyses thus stimulated learning ranging from a minor to a large degree. The step toward challenging the barriers created by gaps in the intended project activities, as anticipated in RPM, was rarely made however. In only one case, the maize network, did the analysis help to develop a new practice, although in an experimental phase. Other suggestions and options for coordinated action proposed by participants were set aside.
In the glass group, the system analysis stimulated system learning (mainly in the sense of recognizing complexity) and convergent learning, without leading to a real change in project actions or new practices, except that of inviting an extra actor to the network. Finally, in the fruit networks, the system analyses provided new insights and stimulated system learning to a limited extent but did not lead to any change in project actions that could logically follow from them.
Therefore, we now discuss how dominant patterns of thinking and acting were sustained in the networks and seem to have reduced the reflexive potential of the new knowledge generated in the system analyses. First of all, the project managers and participants continued to perceive most of the system barriers seen to be caused and reproduced by actors external to the network as given, although these perceptions could have been challenged by explicating them in the analyses. In this way, they took the system barriers into account in designing the project actions. This is comparable to one of the dynamics that Grin and his coauthors found in their study on how the incumbent system favors existing practices even in a system innovation project in which a design for a sustainable system is developed (Grin, 2006; Grin et al., 2004) .
In the fruit networks, we saw in addition how the project managers were very much inclined to stick to their classic role of dissemination of best practices to which they were educated. Thus, their own identities as well as those of the other participants (the farmers as receivers of knowledge) were reinforced, as a consequence of which they stuck to modern problem solving. This corresponds also to one of the dynamics identified by Grin and his coauthors (2004) .
A third and very subtle mechanism was that project managers who themselves were willing to change their roles (in glass and maize) anticipated negative responses of participants or of actors they wanted to invite to the network. Because of anticipated participant resistance, they excluded some options for radical change toward sustainability. Hence, the project managers seemed to be in a constant dilemma of keeping the participants involved versus addressing the main systemic barriers.
A fourth and last dynamic of the incumbent system entering a system innovation project can be described as participating actors anticipating or experiencing a lack of support in the backing organizations or conflict with the constituency. This happened quite often in the maize case. The system analysis did not help to break through this dynamic. The evaluator reflected that this lack of support by the organizations was perceived as a problem but never discussed as a systemic barrier; the underlying social institutions were not scrutinized.
Conclusions
In this article, we have discussed what monitoring could mean for system innovation projects, given the challenges they face, and whether and how the reflexivity of system innovation projects can be supported with the aid of monitoring and evaluation. The focus has been on the IS framework, a specific building block of RPM with which knowledge is generated to give focus to or reorient project actions, on what systemic barriers to tackle, and who to involve or address. Especially in the maize case, reflection on the system analysis results indeed enhanced the reflexivity of a system innovation project. In the other networks, the potential to increase this reflexivity was realized to a lesser extent.
In these final conclusions, we identify the conditions that may help to explain why the added value of the system analyses differed considerably in the four networks and what the consequences are for the methodology of RPM. Because the results of the analyses globally showed many similarities, such as the important role of the retail and auction sectors and the lack of stimuli for farmers to change their practices, the system characteristics alone do not account for the differences. One van Mierlo et al.6 . Formerly, when farmers were subsidized to engage in certain best practices, all farmers had applied them until the subsidy was discontinued.
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